

## **Contextual Factors affecting the Influence of Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council**

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A number of studies arguably offers indirect evidence that non-permanent members (NPMs) have influence in the UN Security Council by establishing that these countries effectively leverage their membership for more aid (Dreher et.al. 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010); or as a result of their membership in the Council are less fearful of international sanctions for poor governance (Bashir and Lim 2013). As an inroad into understanding the influence of the non-permanent membership, however, these studies are not particularly useful, for three reasons. First, they necessarily only look at a part of the non-permanent membership, that is low- and middle income countries in receipt of aid (or with a poor governance record), missing out countries one would intuitively assume to be able to exercise influence because of their administrative capacity or economic power. Second, they tell us little about the form which such influence takes, and what non-permanent members might be doing in return (if anything) for the pay-offs they appear to receive. Third, and this is the entry point into the question of influence that this paper proposes to take, they tell us little about the contextual conditions that shape the ability of non-permanent members to exercise influence in the Council.

This brief paper outlines three propositions about contextual factors shaping NPM influence, and explores how these could be empirically examined. The three factors in question are a) the character of the non-permanent membership; b) the changing workload and working methods of the Security Council, most notably the establishment of a growing number of subsidiary organs to structure and manage a workload that has grown substantially since the end of the cold war; and c) the changing dynamics between the permanent members, in particular the relationship between the “P3” on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other. The focus of the paper is on the non-permanent membership as a whole, and on explaining what contextual factors related to their role or to the membership as a whole might make the non-permanent members able to exercise more or less influence in the Council, rather than on the experience of individual countries.

### ***Influence Pathways of Non-Permanent Members:***

How can non-permanent members (NPMs) influence outcomes at the Security Council, in particular the content of SC decisions in the form of resolutions? NPMs can potentially exercise influence in a number of ways, not all of which are necessarily observable. Three important pathways of influence, however, that could be meaningfully examined, are

- Shaping the Council’s agenda (e.g. by bringing new issues onto the Council’s agenda, which are then substantively discussed and decided on)
- Influencing the text of resolutions, and thus the substance of decisions (e.g. by sponsoring resolutions, or in the negotiations of the text)
- Shaping the implementation of Council decisions (e.g. through membership and in particular chairing of sanctions committees and relevant working groups; or the (co-) chairing of Security Council missions).

Different contextual factors affect these pathways differently. The dynamics between the permanent members, for example, are likely to impact on the ability of NPMs to bring new items

onto the Council's agenda; while the character of the NPM membership is likely to shape their ability to influence the text of resolutions.

As influence is not easily observable, measuring it is not straightforward, especially once the analysis moves beyond individual examples of a country (or countries) managing to exercise influence over a particular issue (where influence might be traced through the process of decision making). We suggest that to trace NPM influence, we need to focus on decisions (i.e. resolutions), and propose the following measures:

- For influencing the agenda, one could identify items added to the Council's agenda by NPMs, the decisions that have been taken on them, and the involvement of NPMs in drafting these decisions. Thus, we would expect to see that a NPM that has brought an issue onto the agenda would be involved in sponsoring relevant resolutions. It should be possible, through analysis of the repertoire, to trace which countries have brought particular items onto the SC agenda.<sup>1</sup>
- For influencing decision-making, we suggest looking at the share and number of resolutions (co-)sponsored by a non-permanent member.
- For shaping the implementation of Council decisions, we suggest looking at the engagement of NPMs with the Council's working practices (e.g. chairing sanctions committees or missions), and the extent to which these activities thematically overlap with involvement in Council decisions (i.e. co-sponsoring resolutions on the same theme(s)).

We would argue that focussing on sponsorship or co-sponsorship of resolutions in particular is a useful way of evaluating influence, as it indicates that a state is either actively involved in shaping the content of a resolution (as only sponsors and co-sponsors of resolutions can approve immediate changes to a draft resolution), or it indicates early support for another state's position expressed during the negotiation phase (rather than afterwards), and thus proxies (however imperfectly) the diplomatic capital a state expends. Sponsoring draft resolutions can have diplomatic consequences, as when Israel recalled its ambassadors from New Zealand and Senegal over their sponsorship of a draft resolution criticising its settlement programme in 2016.<sup>2</sup>

All of these measures have substantial limitations, and are likely to offer conclusive insights only in combination (and in combination with other qualitative evidence documenting processes of influencing), rather than on their own. However, we suggest they can offer initial insights both into the degree and the pathways of NPM influence.

### ***Character of the non-permanent membership***

One factor that might shape the influence of the non-permanent membership is its character – that is the aggregate character of the states that make up this part of the council in terms of their regime type, or their relative economic and military power. Anecdotally, a small group of 10-15 states has occupied the non-permanent seats in the Council with disproportionate frequency – featuring in particular those states who have expressed their aspirations for a permanent seat should the Council be reformed. Between 1991 and 2015, 12 countries accounted for the 69 of the 250 available “country years” of non-permanent membership available, or 28%.<sup>3</sup> We might expect these states to

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<sup>1</sup> One challenge are likely to be items that have been on the agenda for many years, but where the situation evolves and is brought to the attention of the Council, which then debates and possibly acts on it.


<sup>2</sup> “Israeli Ambassador to New Zealand recalled in protest at UN vote role”, *The Guardian*, London, 24 December 2016.

<sup>3</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Spain, and South Africa.

be more influential both because they are more likely to be regional powers (with strong interest or and influence over regional conflicts), or of greater global economic and political importance (and thus have a greater sway in negotiations). We might also expect these states to have greater influence as they can bring experience having been on the Council in the recent past, and thus some familiarity with the issues, practices and dynamics of the Council.

However, the change in the character of the non-permanent membership should not be overstated. For a start, the substantial overrepresentation of a small number of states in the post-cold war period is not that different to the preceding 25 years (1966-1990), when 12 states made up for 68 of the 250 available “country-years” (though, of course, the overall membership of the UN was smaller). While the composition of this group is different,<sup>4</sup> it overlaps substantially: Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Nigeria feature prominently in both periods. It is therefore not obvious that the character of the non-permanent membership has systematically changed since the end of the cold war. While this, of course, does not suggest conclusions about the influence of NPMs, it does caution against invoking the changing character of the non-permanent membership as an indication that NPMs might now be more influential than in the past.

Furthermore, as Table 1 suggests, the “usual suspects” more frequently elected to non-permanent seats on the Council might not be the ones most actively involved in Council decision-making, or seeking to influence outcomes through Council processes. While only providing a snapshot of Council decision making over a seven-year period (2010 - 2016), it suggests that the most active NPMs were not necessarily the aspirants for a permanent seat (Brazil, Nigeria), or countries that had been on the Council relatively recently. Instead, a high per-capita GDP (Austria, Japan, Germany, Luxembourg) correlates well with greater involvement in Council decision-making. If this pattern were to be found to be consistent over the years, it might suggest that stronger state capacity and a strong diplomatic service are more important for exercising influence in the Council, rather than regional power status or frequency of presence on the Council (See Figure 1).



There are obviously other ways in which the impact of the character of the NPMs on their influence could be explored, for example by looking at regime type (e.g. the number of democracies among

<sup>4</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, and Yugoslavia. All of these were been on the Council for 4-10 years in the period in question. Another 5 countries not listed here were on the council for four years in that period.

them, or the average democracy score from datasets such as Polity IV); or their military strength (e.g. by comparing per capita military expenditure). A more detailed analysis could also examine whether characteristics of member states such as their per capita income (as a proxy for bureaucratic capacity), size, regime type, or military expenditure correlate with engagement with Council business, and influence on Council decisions. This initial look at the evidence, however, challenges the intuition that the character of NPM has substantially changed over the last two decades, and that this change might have affected the influence of NPMs in the Council.

### ***Changing Workload and Working Methods of the Council***

The Council's workload has increased substantially over the last 25 years, compared to the cold war period. This is reflected in the increased number of meetings, of items on its agenda, and of resolutions. A corollary of this has been the establishment of a growing number of subsidiary bodies that are staffed and run by members of the Council – most notably Sanctions Committees and the Counter –Terrorism Committee, and a number of thematic working groups. In addition, the Council has made increased use of missions deployed to form a better view of conflict and political dynamics “on the ground”.

The Council's committee structure and missions arguably offer opportunities for NPMs to exert influence on the Council's work and decision making: by chairing committees, or by leading missions, they enhance their role vis-à-vis the issues in question, and could be expected to have a greater voice and influence in decisions. We can therefore look whether the roles that NPMs assume to support the day-to-day running of the Council, or to advance particular thematic agendas, feed through into their role in Council decision-making. Looking at table 1, it seems there is no consistent link between chairing a sanctions committee or working group on the one hand, and strong involvement in the negotiation of resolutions (indicated by co-sponsorship) on the other. In some cases (such as the committee on international tribunals) there is a strong relationship between chairing the committee and (sole) sponsoring resolutions – almost all of which are very minor resolutions about appointments. Similarly Turkey, which chaired the Council's mission to Afghanistan, was sole sponsor of the Council's two resolutions on that country in 2010. Beyond this, non-permanent members are rarely prominent sponsors of resolutions (i.e. among only a small number of sponsors) for countries or issues they are chairing a relevant sanctions committee on (e.g. Nigeria on Iraq, or Mexico on Somalia).

In recent years, non-permanent members have also become pen holders for a number of issues on the Council's agenda (most notably Afghanistan; Guinea-Bissau; Children in Armed Conflict; Women, Peace and Security; and the different international criminal tribunals established by the Council). As pen holders, NPMs have greater influence on the resolutions, and it can be reflected in their role as sponsors: since 2009, all but one resolution on Afghanistan (12 in total) have been sponsored by one state only, and always a NPM.

Looking in more detail at the working methods of the Council thus appears to be a more promising avenue for identifying the pathways of NPM influence, and it might be possible to compare over time whether changes in working methods over time have affected NPM influence. However, the initial analysis presented here does not suggest that the changes in working methods have brought about a substantial increase in the influence of NPMs on Council business.

### **Dynamics between the permanent members**

Dynamics between the permanent members are likely to affect the influence that non-permanent members can exercise. When the P5 are divided, non-permanent members might be able to play an

important role in facilitating between them and proposing solutions acceptable to all. If members of the P5 are divided over an issue, they might seek support from non-permanent members for resolutions they are seeking to pass, giving NPMs leverage in negotiations over their content.

Formally measuring the dynamics between the P5 is inherently difficult. As a starter for 10, we are using the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, and look at Russian attitudes towards the US from 2011 onwards (table 2). To see whether this has any discernible impact on Security Council decision making, we look at the number of resolutions passed each year (as an indicator of Council activity), the share of unanimous resolutions, and the number of vetoes and resolutions not adopted (as an indication of the divisions in the Council), and the share of draft resolutions sponsored by a single P5 member (as an indication of NPM leverage – a lower share of resolutions without a NPM sponsor suggests lower leverage). While this preliminary data offers some support that the Council is more divided over its decisions at a time where Russian attitudes towards the US are predominantly unfavourable, it does not offer clear support for the notion that a divided council offers opportunities for NPMs to exercise influence. If anything, the share of resolutions sponsored by a single P5 member has gone up in recent years when the Council was more divided and polarised, offering no support for stronger NPM leverage. One possible reason might be that costs of taking side early in a negotiation are higher for NPMs when the Council is polarised; but merely looking at a five year period does not offer enough data to come to firm conclusions on this. Alternatively, this might indicate that when the P5 (or in particular the P3 on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other) are divided, there is more ongoing business (i.e. issues already on the agenda), few new issues added, and thus fewer visible opportunities for NPMs to exercise influence, as there is a certain path dependency for many issues already on the Council's agenda (e.g. mandate renewals). Indeed, since 2008 the number of new items on the Council's agenda has been very low – between 0 and 3 per year, compared to an average of 12-13 per year in the preceding decade.

### **Concluding Reflections:**

The assumption underlying the discussion above is that contextual factors shape the ability of NPMs to exercise influence over outcomes of Security Council decisions – and as the context changes, NPM influence will change as well. The very initial look at some of the possible data to examine the propositions above suggests that this might offer some promising avenues to explore NPM influence. There is a number of key challenges, and questions for discussion, that this initial exploration exposes. These include:

- Are the proposed measurements of influence, in particular sponsorship of resolutions, an appropriate and robust measure of influence of NPMs? One particular problem is that such an approach gives the same weight to all resolutions, not distinguishing, for example, between a resolution authorising the use of force to protect civilians in Libya and a resolution appointing a new judge to the ICTY.
- Are there other important contextual factors that this discussion has missed?
- Are there better ways of measuring the dynamics between the P5?

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**Annexes:**

<b>Table 1: Draft Resolutions sponsored by members of the UN Security Council, 2010</b>					
<b>Country</b>	<b>No of Draft Resolutions Sponsored</b>	<b>Committee Chairs</b>	<b>Working Group Chairs</b>	<b>SC Mission Chairs</b>	<b>Comments</b>
TOTAL	60				59 Resolutions adopted by UNSC in 2010
Austria	18	AQ/Taliban; Sudan/Darfur	International Tribunals		Sole sponsor of six resolutions on Tribunals which are adopted
Bosnia	8	Liberia	/		Resolutions sponsored normally sponsored by majority of SC members. Did not sponsor any of the Liberia resolutions
Brazil	7	DRC, Cote d'Ivoire	/		Three of the seven draft resolutions relate to Haiti
China	8	/	/		
France	30	/	/	SC Mission to DRC	
Gabon	12	Lebanon	Member of PBC organisational committee		Six draft resolutions on African PKOs
Japan	16	Iran	Peacekeeping; Documentation and Procedural Questions		
Lebanon	9	/	/		
Mexico	8	Terrorism/WMD; Somalia and Eritrea	Children in Armed conflict		Three of the sponsored resolutions relate to Haiti
Nigeria	11	Iraq	/		Four resolutions relate to African conflicts, two to Iraq
Russia	12	/	/		Hardly any sponsored resolutions relate to African PKOs (except one on MINURSO)
Turkey	15	Counter Terrorism DPRK	Additional Measures on Terrorism	SC Mission to Afghanistan	Sole sponsor of draft resolutions on ISAF and UNAMA in Afghanistan (adopted)
Uganda	10	/	Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa	SC Mission to Uganda and the Sudan	Half of the resolutions sponsored relate to African PKOs and conflicts; three of them to Somalia

UK	28	/	/	SC Mission to Uganda and the Sudan	
US	31	/	/	SC Mission to Uganda the Sudan	

Country (2011)	No of Draft Resolutions Sponsored	Committee Chairs	Working Group Chairs	SC Mission Chairs	Comments
TOTAL	67				66
Bosnia and Herzegovina	9		Documentation and Other Procedural Questions		Three of the nine resolutions relate to Libya
Brazil	5	DRC, Côte d'Ivoire			
China	5				Two resolutions relate to Cyprus
Colombia	8	Sudan/Darfur, Iran			Two resolutions relate to Libya
France	41			SC Mission to Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya	
Gabon	19	Lebanon			Nine of 19 resolutions relate to African conflicts
Germany	26	Al-Qaida/ Taliban	Children and Armed Conflict		
India	8	Counterterrorism, Somalia-Eritrea	Additional Measures on Terrorism		Three resolutions relate to Somalia/piracy
Lebanon	14	Liberia			Five resolutions related to Libya, four to UN Missions
Nigeria	21	Iraq	Peacekeeping		Sponsored three resolutions on African conflicts with only one other states, seven resolutions related to Peacekeeping
Portugal	27	DPRK	International		Sole sponsor

			Tribunals		for six resolutions related to International Tribunals
Russia	13			SC Mission to Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya	Three solutions on Libya
South Africa	9	WMD	Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa	SC Mission to Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya	Five Resolutions related to Peacekeeping
UK	32			SC Mission to Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya	
US	40			SC Mission to Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya	

Country (2012)	No of Draft Resolutions Sponsored	Committee Chairs	Working Group Chairs	SC Mission Chairs	Comments
TOTAL	55				53
Azerbaijan	1	DRC			Sponsored resolution on EUFOR ALTHEA
China	3				Two resolutions relate to Syria
Colombia	8	Sudan/Darfur; Iran			Three resolutions relate to Syria
France	32				
Germany	25	Al-Quaida; Taliban	Children and Armed Conflict		One resolution relates to Al-Quaida
Guatemala	7	Côte d'Ivoire	International Tribunals		Four out of seven resolutions relate to International Tribunals
India	4	Counterterrorism, Somalia-Eritrea	Additional Measures on Terrorism		Two resolutions relate to Africa, two resolutions relate to piracy and armed robbery
Morocco	11		Peacekeeping	SC Mission to Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone	Four resolutions relate to Peacekeeping

Pakistan	2	Liberia			
Portugal	16	DPRK; Libya	Documentation and Other Procedural Questions		Sole sponsor of resolution on Guinea-Bissau
Russia	7				
South Africa	10	WMD	Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa	SC Mission to Timor-Leste	Seven resolutions relate to African conflicts
Togo	11	Iraq; Lebanon			Seven out of eleven resolutions relate to African conflicts
UK	31				
US	34			SC Mission to Haiti; SC Mission to Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone	

Country (2013)	No of Draft Resolutions Sponsored	Committee Chairs	Working Group Chairs	SC Mission Chairs	Comments
TOTAL	47				47
Argentina	6		Documentation and Other Procedural Questions		Three of out six resolutions relate to Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding
Australia	20	Taliban; Al-Quaida; Iran			Sole sponsor of resolutions on Afghanistan (extension of UN Assistance Mission), also sponsored resolution on the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee
Azerbaijan	2	DRC		SC Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia	
China	0				
France	30			SC Mission to the Democratic	

				Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia	
Guatemala	4	Côte d'Ivoire	International Tribunals		One resolution relate to International Tribunals
Luxembourg	18	DPRK	Children and Armed Conflict		Twelve resolutions relate to Peacekeeping
Morocco	15	Guinea-Bissau, Counterterrorism; WMD	Additional Measures on Terrorism	SC Mission to Yemen; SC Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia	Ten resolutions related to African conflicts
Pakistan	1	Liberia	Peacekeeping		Sponsored one resolutions on the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
Republic of Korea	15	Somalia-Eritrea			Eight resolutions relate to Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding; two resolutions related to the DPRK
Russia	4				Two resolutions on Peacekeeping in Africa
Rwanda	19	Libya	Conflict Resolution and Prevention in Africa	SC Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia	14 resolutions out of 19 relate to African conflicts
Togo	24	Iraq, Lebanon			15 resolutions relate to Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding
UK	30			SC Mission to Yemen; SC Mission to the Democratic	

				Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia	
US	35			SC Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia	

Country (2014)	No of Draft Resolutions Sponsored	Committee Chairs	Working Group Chairs	SC Mission Chairs	Comments
TOTAL	66				63
Argentina	8	Sudan	Documentation and Other Procedural Questions		Sponsored no resolution on Peacekeeping Missions
Australia	35	Taliban; Al-Qaida, Iran		SC Mission to Europe and Africa	
Chad	24	Lebanon		SC Mission to Mali	Six resolutions on Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding
Chile	16	Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq	International Tribunals	SC Mission to Europe and Africa	Sole sponsor of two resolutions on International Tribunals
China	2				Sponsor of resolution referring the situation in Syria to the ICC
France	48			SC Mission to Mali	
Jordan	24	DRC, Liberia			Sponsored no resolutions on DRC or Liberia
Lithuania	33	CAR, Counterterrorism	Additional Measures on Terrorism		Six resolutions relate to Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism
Luxembourg	36	DPRK	Children and Armed Conflict	SC Mission to Europe and Africa	Twelve resolutions on Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding
Nigeria	25	Guinea-Bissau	Conflict Prevention and Resolution in	SC Mission to Europe and Africa	Eleven resolutions on Peacekeeping,

			Africa		Peacebuilding in Africa
Republic of Korea	32	Somalia-Eritrea, WMD			One resolution relates to the DPRK
Russia	9				Four resolutions on Peacekeeping
Rwanda	25	Libya	Peacekeeping	SC Mission to Europe and Africa	10 resolutions related to African conflicts
UK	45			SC Mission to Europe and Africa	
US	53			SC Mission to Europe and Africa	

Country (2015)	No of Draft Resolutions Sponsored	Committee Chairs	Working Group Chairs	SC Mission Chairs	Comments
TOTAL	66				65
Angola	19		Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; Documentation and Other Procedural Questions	SC Mission to the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Burundi	11 resolutions related to Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding
Chad	10	Lebanon	Peacekeeping		Six out of ten resolutions related to Peacekeeping in Africa
Chile	14	Côte d'Ivoire	International Tribunals	SC Mission to Haiti	Sole sponsor of one resolution on International Tribunals, sponsor of resolution on Haiti
China	1				Sponsored one resolution on Al-Quaida
France	37			SC Mission to the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Burundi	
Jordan	20	DRC; Liberia			Nine resolutions on Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding

Lithuania	27	CAR; Yemen; Counterterrorism	Additional Measures on Terrorism		Two resolutions on Terrorism, Counterterrorism
Malaysia	21	Libya	Children and Armed Conflict		Sponsored resolution on Children and Armed Conflict
New Zealand	20	Al-Qaida			Two resolutions relate to Al- Qaida, one resolution to the Taliban
Nigeria	11	Guinea-Bissau; Iraq			Six resolutions relate to Peacekeeping in Africa
Russia	6				
Spain	28	DPRK; Iran; WMD			
UK	41				
US	44			SC Mission to Haiti; SC Mission to the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Burundi	
Venezuela	11	Somalia-Eritrea			Five resolutions relate to Peacekeeping in Africa

Country (2016)	No of Draft Resolutions Sponsored	Committee Chairs	Working Group Chairs	SC Mission Chairs	Comments
TOTAL	83				79
Angola	15		Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa	SC Mission to Burundi and Ethiopia; SC Mission to Mali, Guinea- Bissau and Senegal; SC Mission to the DRC and Angola	Nine resolutions relate to Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding
China	2				
Egypt	11	Counterterrorism, DRC, Iraq	Additional Measures on Terrorism	SC Mission to Burundi and Ethiopia; SC Mission to the Horn of Africa	Four resolutions on Peacekeeping, two resolutions on Syria
France	30			SC Mission to Burundi and Ethiopia; SC Mission to	

				Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, SC Mission to the DRC and Angola	
Japan	24	Lebanon, Yemen	Documentation and Other Procedural Measures		Two resolutions relate to the DPRK
Malaysia	16	Libya	Children and Armed Conflict		Six resolutions on Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding
New Zealand	19	Taliban, Al-Quaida			One resolution relates to Terrorism
Russia	6				
Senegal	17	South Sudan	Peacekeeping	SC Mission to South Sudan and Addis Ababa	Seven resolutions related to Peacekeeping in Africa
Spain	23	DPRK, WMD			Two resolutions relate to the DPRK, sole sponsor of a resolution on the extension of the UN Assistance Missions in Afghanistan
Ukraine	21	CAR, Liberia			Ten resolutions related to Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping
UK	33			SC Mission to the Horn of Africa	
US	45			SC Mission to Burundi and Ethiopia; SC Mission to Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal; SC Mission to South Sudan and Addis Ababa	
Uruguay	18	Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau	International Tribunals		Sole sponsor of three resolutions relating to the

					International Tribunals
Venezuela	8	Somalia-Eritrea; Sudan			Three resolutions on Peacekeeping in Africa

Year	Russian favourable opinion of the US	Number of resolutions	Share of unanimous resolutions	Resolutions vetoed or not adopted	Share of resolutions sponsored by one P5 only
2011	56	65	96%	2	22%
2012	52	53	94%	2	22%
2013	51	47	91%	1	9%
2014	23	63	95%	3	12%
2015	15	64	86%	2	36%
2016	--	77	85%	4	49%